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PROBLEMS OF CONSTRUCTION ARISING IN THE
LAW OF PROPERTY-PARTICULARLY IN
THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS
REYNOLDS D. BROWN
INTRODUCTION
The object of this series of studies is, not to produce an
elaborate treatise on the various topics to be discussed, but to
call to the attention of the profession certain problems of con-
struction arising in the Law of Property-particularly, in the Law
of Future Interests. A discussion of the Pennsylvania decisions
in the light of those in other jurisdictions, and particularly the
common law, seems to the writer to demonstrate that in some
of these situations the Pennsylvania courts have taken an errone-
ous view; it is his hope that, as a result of attention being called
to them, the legislature or the courts will find a way to clear up
the difficulties and to place the law on this subject on a more
rational basis.
A. Value of rules of construction
While the problems to be discussed are in many respects en-
tirely independent of each other, they seem to the writer to have
a marked family resemblance. There are in approaching them
two radically different methods of treatment. The first is to treat
each case as a distinct problem in itself, and to ignore largely or
(385)
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entirely the prior decisions in similar cases; this method is attrac-
tively described as "Looking at the four corners of the will for
the testator's intention", and its adherents refuse to be bound
by any rules which might hamper such effort. The second method
is based upon two principles: The first is that it is the duty of
the court "To ascertain not what the testator actually intended,
as distinguished from what his words express, but what is the
meaning of the words he used". Next, in order to ascertain what
that meaning is, we have the dictum laid down by Lord Redes-
dale in lesson v. Wright,1 that "technical words shall have their
legal effect unless from subsequent inconsistent words it is very
clear that the testator meant otherwise". Concretely, these two
principles mean: "Have your rules of construction and abide by
them wherever possible".
The fundamental question, on the answer to which depends
the correctness of these conflicting methods of approach, is
whether or not in cases of this character the testator has in his
mind a definite intention. If so, it is the duty of the court to
ascertain it and carry it out; if not, it is awaste of time (or
worse) for the court to try to ascertain it. It is submitted that,
contrary to a very general assumption of certain courts in dealing
with problems of this character, it is a mistake to assume that
a testator who uses expressions of the kind to be considered, him-
self attaches an exact meaning to the words that he has used.
This statement requires some elucidation. It must, of course,
be admitted that the ordinary testator has a fairly definite picture
in his mind of the property that he possesses and the persons whom
he desires to benefit. But if, for example, he owns a particular
piece of real estate which he desires to give to A, with, however, a
proviso that in a certain contingency it shall go to B, he expresses
to the draftsman of his will his general wish, and leaves to such
draftsman, especially if he be a lawyer, the expression of that
intent in legal form. He may, for example, tell his counsel that
he wants to leave Whiteacre to A, but if A die without children,
then Whiteacre is to go to B. When his counsel prepares a draft
of the will, the testator finds some such words as these: "I give
12 Bligh I (i82o).
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and devise Whiteacre to A and his heirs" ; he inquires of his coun-
sel what the words "and his heirs" mean, perhaps adding that he
does not intend to benefit A's heirs, but only A, and his counsel
replies that by the words used he is only benefiting A, because
the additional words "and his heirs", although they appear to the
lay mind to give an interest of some kind to A's heirs, really
give them no interest whatever, but that this is the technical way
of giving A an estate in fee simple, and that counsel assumes that
it was this kind of an estate or interest, being the greatest known
to the law, that the testator desired to confer upon A. The
testator acquiesces, but with a distinct impression that the phrase-
ology of the law is very confusing, and that he must rely on his
counsel to see that the proper phraseology is used to carry out his
wishes. In the draft submitted to him, he next observes that fol-
lowing the gift of Whiteacre to A and his heirs, occur these
words: "provided, however, that if A die without issue, White-
acre shall pass to B and his heirs". At this point he may either
ask counsel what he means by the expression "die without issue",
and be told by his counsel (perhaps erroneously) that this is the
legal way of expressing his wish that "if A die without children",
Whiteacre shall pass to B; or possibly, having learned by this
time that the phraseology of the law is beyond his ken, he may
simply take for granted that his counsel has expressed in legal
phraseology his wish that "if A die without children", Whiteacre
shall pass to B, and let it go at that. To vary the illustration-
in thousands of cases, land or personalty has been devised or
bequeathed by a testator "To A for life, remainder to his heirs".
It seems certain that no testator who makes such a gift has an
accurate picture in his mind as to what is to happen at A's death;
if he were asked, after executing his will, whether at A's death he
wanted the property to pass to A's heirs indefinitely, or whether
on the other hand he wanted the property to pass at A's death to
A's heirs, so to speak, in their own right, and after their death
to their heirs whoever they might be, he would, if accurate and
truthful, doubtless reply that he knew nothing of such alterna-
tives, and had, therefore, no preference with regard to the matter.
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If these illustrations represent the real truth with regard to
the intention (or lack of intention) on the part of the ordinary
testator in such cases, it seems to follow that the courts in dealing
with these problems of construction are mistaken in emphasizing
their desire to ascertain and carry out the testator's intention;
their real function in cases of this character would seem to be,
not to search the four corners of the will to ascertain an intention
that is not (or may not be) there, but rather to interpret the mean-
ing of the words he actually used. As stated by Baron Parke in
Doe v. Gwilliam:2 "In expounding a will the court is to ascertain
not what the testator actually intended, as contra-distinguished
from what his words express, but what is the meaning of the
words he used". Or again, as stated by Lord Denman in Rick-
man z. Carstairs:', "The question . . . is not what was the in-
tention of the parties, but what is the meaning of the words they
havc used". Finally, as stated by Mr. Justice Holmes in Eaton
v. Browi :4 "The English courts are especially and wisely careful
not to substitute a lively imagination of what a testator would
have said if his attention had been directed to a particular point,
for what he has said in fact".
This principle has recently been recognized by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania in Packer's Estate, (No. 2) 5 where, quot-
ing from Joyce's Estate,' the court said: "It must be steadily
borne in mind that it is not the province of the court to consider
what the testator possibly intended, but only what intention is
expressed in the language used". Professor Gray expressed this
thought in his usually convincing way in his work on "Nature
and Sources of the Law"; in Section 702 he said:
"When a testator has a real intention, it is not once in
a hundred times that he fails to make his meaning clear
. . .When the judges say they are interpreting the inten-
tion of a testator, what they are doing ninety-nine times out
of a hundred is deciding what shall be done with his prop-
erty on contingencies that he did not have in contemplation.
5 B. & Ad. 122, at 129 (1833).
"5 Ibid. 651, at 663.
4 193 U. S. 411, at 413, 24 Sup. Ct. 487 (1903).
G291 Pa. 198, 139 Atl. 868 (1927).
'273 Pa. 404, at 407, 117 AtI. 9o, at 91 (1922).
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Now for cases in which a testator has not provided, it may
be well that there should be fixed rules as there are for de-
scent in cases of intestacy".
The writer believes strongly in the desirability of such rules
of construction-partly for the reasons above pointed out, and
partly also for the reason that they tend to definiteness in the law,
whereas on the other hand, if what a court is seeking for is some
unexpressed intent of the testator, the decision as to that ques-
tion, not being based upon any rules of construction, necessarily
depends on the idiosyncracies of the particular judge who decides
the case, and quite obviously forms no basis for a judgment as to
how another court (or even the same court) might decide a sub-
stantially similar case in the future; indeed the courts which seek
the testator's intention, realizing that the decision reached is often
not in line with decisions reached in similar cases, not infrequently
use some such expression as: "This is an unusual case and must
not be treated as a precedent"-thus tacitly recognizing the jus-
tice of the criticism that logically the case should have been de-
cided differently. True it is that the rules of construction which
are evolved by the courts have in many instances proved to be
unsatisfactory and have either been overruled by the courts or
changed by the legislatures; even so, it seems better that there
should be rules as to which counsel may advise, and on the faith
of which counsel may construe a will with considerable confidence
as to the decision of the court, rather than to have the unsatis-
factory alternative of counsel being obliged to inform his client
that, there being no rules of construction applicable, the decision
as to the meaning of a will must necessarily depend upon the un-
ascertainable view that an individual judge or a particular court
may take of the question. The importance of having such defi-
nite rules of construction will be illustrated many times in the
course of these studies. The writer further believes that it is
possible by following rules of construction to arrive at definite
answers to all, or almost all, of the problems of construction to
be here discussed; in other words, just as Professor Gray in his
"Rule against Perpetuities" has demonstrated that that rule may
be stated in almost mathematical terms, so that the application of
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it is not difficult, so in the problems of construction to be dis-
cussed, the writer submits that, if proper rules of construction are
followed, it is not simply a question of opinion which of two
conflicting views is correct, but it is fairly susceptible of demon-
stration that one is correct and the other is erroneous.
B. Significance of contemporary legal conceptions as affecting
rules of construction
One other factor should be mentioned at the outset as of
large importance in dealing with problems of this kind, and that
is the views of the day with respect to legal conceptions. In
common law times, for example, when estates tail were both fa-
miliar and popular, it was inevitable that the construction given
by the court to the phrase "if A shall die without issue" should
tend to be different from the construction given to the same words
at the present day when estates tail have been universally abol-
ished; the cutting down of a fee simple previously created by the
testator to a fee tail, by the use of the words "if A die without
issue", while to the layman or even the lawyer of the present
day it seems to be a far-fetched and improbable construction of
such phrase, yet to the lawyer (and probably to the layman) of
two or three hundred years ago, this construction must have
seemed not only natural, but desirable. Or again, in the case of
a gift of land to A for life, remainder to his heirs, the so-called
rule in Shelley's Case,7 which declared that the testator has by
the use of such words given A a fee simple, must have repre-
sented the popular verdict as to the proper construction of these
words in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries when land was
seldom conveyed, and hardly even capable of being devised; obvi-
ously, under such economic conditions the testator who had given
property to A for life with remainder to his heirs would normally
have assumed that the property would pass on through A's heirs,
and the correct legal way to accomplish this result was to give A
a fee simple. If some courts and legislatures have shrunk from
this conclusion today, and have either by judicial decision or
I Coke Rep. 93 b (591).
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legislative enactment done away with the rule in Shelley's Case,
it is primarily because at the present day economic conditions
have so changed that when, as the result of the rule in Shelley's
Case, A is under such circumstances given a fee simple, the com--
mon understanding is that either because of his conveying it in
his lifetime, or devising it by his will, the chances are small that
the estate thus given to A will ever subsequently benefit his heirs.
It is submitted that economic and social considerations of the
kind suggested have a natural and proper weight in determining
the proper rules of construction, and that as such economic and
social factors change, the original rules of construction may be
found unsatisfactory, and in that event should be changed. But
there is a marked difference, of course, between changing rules
of construction when circumstances require it, and having no
rules of construction, or, as it is sometimes expressed, having
rules of construction which are of little weight as against the
supposed insight on the part of the court into the testator's mind
and intention.
DYING WITHOUT ISSUE (AND SUNDRY COROLLARIES)"
It is proposed to start this series of studies of problems of
construction relating to future interests in property with a study
of what is perhaps the most familiar problem of construction
known to the Law of Property. In literally thousands of cases
a testator has devised or bequeathed property to A and his heirs
with a proviso that if A "die without issue", the property shall
pass to B and his heirs. Perhaps it may assist in the subsequent
study of this problem to summarize some of the principal varia-
tions which the problem may take. There are four familiar
cases:
8 When this study was almost completed, there appeared in (1930) 79 U. OF
PA. L. REV. I5, an interesting article by Philip Werner Amram of the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania Law School entitled Pennsylvania Rules for Construction
of the Words "die without issue". Obviously that article covers somewhat the
same ground as the the present article, but the general object sought to be
accomplished by this article, namely, the remedy of certain defects in the law,
has rendered the treatment sufficiently different to justify the REvIEw in pub-
lishing both articles.
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(i) Gift to A for life, remainder to his issue.
(2) Gift to A for life, remainder to his issue or children,
and if he die without issue or children, then to B and
his heirs.
(3) Gift to A for life, and if he die without issue, then to
B and his heirs.
(4) Gift to A and his heirs, and if he die without issue,
then to B and his heirs.
(There are other less important variations of the same gen-
eral theme, for example, dying "without leaving any lawful is-
sue", which was held in Eichelberger v. Barnitz, to be equiva-
lent to "dying without issue".)
For the purposes of the following discussion, two other vari-
ations should be borne in mind. The first is the nature of the
property; in some cases the subject matter is realty, in some cases
personalty, and in some cases both. Again, in a number of cases
which will be considered, the word "children" is used instead of
the word "issue".
The correct construction of such expressions has caused an
immense amount of litigation, and the decisions have, in the opin-
ion of the writer, in many such cases been such that the testators,
if they were aware of them, would doubtless be astounded at the
results.
A. Several meanings of the word "issue"
We first proceed to an examination of several of the possi-
ble ambiguities that may arise in connection with the phrase "if
A die without issue". The first ambiguity obviously has to do
with the meaning of the word "issue" itself. This word has had
a long legal history, and it is proposed to review this history
briefly, not limiting the review entirely to cases of "dying with-
out issue". Jarman in his well-known work 10 starts with the
proposition that:
"The word 'issue' embraces descendants of every de-
gree whensoever existent, and unless restricted by context
9 Watts 447 (Pa. 1840).
"2 JARMAN, WILLS (6th Am. ed. 1893) *I257 (p. 403).
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cannot be satisfied by being applied to descendants at a given
period. The only mode by which a devise to the issue can
be made to run through the whole line of objects comprised
in the term is by considering it as a word of limitation
synonymous with 'heirs of the body'; by which means an
ancestor takes an estate tail; an estate capable of compris-
ing in its devolution, though not simultaneously, all the ob-
jects embraced by the word 'issue' in its largest sense";
he adds, however, that:
"If there be on the face of the will sufficient to show
that the word was intended to have a less extensive meaning
and to be applied only to children or to descendants of a par-
ticular class or at a particular time, it is to be construed as
a word of purchase and not of limitation"."'
The quotation from Jarman emphasizes two familiar facts:
first, that the word "issue" has two possible meanings, either
"heirs of the body" or "children", and secondly, that according to
the common law its prima facie meaning was the more extensive
one, i. e., "heirs of the body". It follows, therefore, as Jarman
points out,12 that a "devise to a person.and his issue, confers an
estate tail; and it may be observed that such a devise is not (as is
a devise to a person and his children) dependent on, or, it seems,
in the least degree influenced by, the fact of there being or not
being issue of the devisee living at the date of the will (or at
any other period)". It is further pointed out:
".... that a devise to A and his issue living at his death creates
an estate tail in A. In such a case it is clear that the issue
cannot take as joint tenants with him since the objects are
not ascertainable until the death of the parent. It is only
through him that they can become entitled, and the case falls,
therefore, within the principle of the Rule in Wild's Case,
namely that the parent must take an estate tail in order to
let in the other objects". 3
Rule in Wild's case: In passing, an interesting analogous prob-
lem grows out of the not uncommon devise or conveyance "to A
"Ibid. n. i.
"Ibid. *1258 (p. 404).
"Ibid. *1259 (p. 405).
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and his childdren", and a short study of it may throw some light
on the main problem under consideration. It is, of course, well
settled that a devise or conveyance to A and his heirs, or to A and
the heirs of his body, gives nothing to the heirs or the heirs of the
body; these words are treated as merely descriptive of the estate
given to A, who in the first instance takes an estate in fee simple
and in the second an estate in tee tail. This familiar thought is
commonly expressed by saying that in these expressions the words
"heirs" or "heirs of the body" are not words of purchase, but are
words of limitation, meaning, of course, that they limit or define
the quantum of the estate in A. The authorities above cited 14
show that the same result follows where the conveyance or devise
is "to A and his issue"; at least if there be no context which re-
quires the word "issue" to be otherwise construed, it is treated as
equivalent to "heirs of the body" (which is, of course, its prima
facie meaning); the word "issue", therefore, becomes a word of
limitation and A takes an estate in fee tail precisely as if the con-
veyance or devise had been to A and the heirs of his body.
The primary problem in the case of a conveyance or devise to
A and his children may, therefore, be stated to be "Is the word
'children', like the word 'heirs' or 'heirs of the body' or 'issue', to be
treated as a word of limitation, defining the extent of A's estate,
or is it per contra to be treated as a word of purchase, giving some
interest to A's children ?" The common law gave a double answer
to this question. In Wild's Case," this distinction is taken:
"( i ) If A devises land to B and to his children or issue,
and he hath not any issue at the time of the devise, the case is
an estate tail, for the intent is manifest and certain that his
children or issue should take, and as immediate devisees they
cannot take because they are not in rerum natura, and by way
of remainder they cannot take, for that was not his intent for
the gift is immediate; therefore, then such words shall be
taken as words of limitation.
(2) But if a man devises land to A and his children or
issue and he then has issue, his express intent may take effect
according to the rule of Common Law, and no manifest and
"* Supra notes IO, et seq.
' 6 Coke 16 b (41 Eliz.).
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certain intent appears to the contrary, and therefore in such
case they shall have a joint estate for life".
The following comments may be made on the above state-
ment: ( i ) That evidently in the foregoing statement the word "is-
sue" or "issues" means "issue" or "issues" only when the context
shows that "issue" meant "children" and not "heirs of the body";
in other words, the rule does not apply to a simple gift to A and his
issue. (2) That the first resolution above quoted is another illus-
tration of the common law preference for an estate tail; certainly
for centuries there has been no reason why children cannot take by
way of remainder, and it is somewhat evading the question to say
that "that was not his (the testator's) intent for the gift is imme-
diate". At least in certain courts doubt has been raised as to
whether the gift is "immediate". (3) The second resolution in
effect declares that if there are children, the word "children" is not
to be treated as a word of limitation, but on the contrary A and the
existing children shall take a joint estate for life; it is the first
judicial step in the direction of recognizing that the word "chil-
dren" may not be a word of limitation; assuming this, and remem-
bering that at common law A in such a case only took a life inter-
est, it was a not unnatural inference of the common law that A and
his children shall take some kind of a life interest together, and the
favored form of holding together according to common law con-
ceptions was the joint estate. An effort will now be made to trace
the further development of this so-called rule in Wild's Case, both
in the English decisions and in the various courts of this country.
Examining first the second resolution in Wild's Case (deal-
ing with the situation where A has children) the weight of modern
authority both in England and in this country favors the view
that, as stated in Wild's Case, the parent and the children take con-
currently; true, as stated by Lord Cranworth in Byng v. Byng, 16
this is only a prima facie rule of construction, but as a matter of
fact in most cases there is little or nothing to alter the prima facic
meaning of the words. Numerous cases supporting this prima
facie meaning may be found in the reports not only of the English
10 H. L. Cas. 171, at 178 (1862).
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courts, but of many states including Alabama, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Virginia, etc. Doubtless under
modern rules as to the extent of estates created by will, A and his
children may take a joint estate in fee instead of a joint estate for
life, and doubtless also in different jurisdictions where the prefer-
ence for joint estates has disappeared, the estate of A and his chil-
dren may be a tenancy in common instead of a joint estate. How-
ever, in the main in most jurisdictions the second resolution in
Wild's Case is, subject to the above-mentioned qualifications, still
in force. Creeping through these decisions has, however, been the
thought that it may not take much additional light from the con-
text to produce the quite different result of giving A a life interest
followed by a remainder to his children. In Wills v. Foltz," after
a life interest to one X, the testator bequeathed the balance of his
property "To A, B and C and their children"; A, B and C were
the illegitimate children of the testator by X. At the time of the
testator's death A had three children, B had five children and C
had four children with one more born after the testator's death.
.4 was the only one who was married at the date of the will, and
at that time she had two children. The lower court held that the
three daughters and their children took a joint estate in fee per
capita and A appealed. The decree was affirmed by the Supreme
Court which followed the resolutions in TVild's Case and held that
under the modern statute the concurrent estate taken by the three
daughters and their children was a fee simple. The judge who
rendered the opinion admits that this may not have been the testa-
tor's intention: "he thought it either would confer on his daugh-
ters a fee or life estate"."8 But, he held that under the weight of
authority he could not reach any other conclusion.
A quite different conclusion has, however, been reached in at
least the two states of Kentucky and Pennsylvania. In the leading
case of Rice v. Klette,19 it is said: "Under the more recent deci-
sions of this court where there is nothing in a deed or will to show
a contrary purpose, the rule is to hold an estate deeded or devised
1'6I W. Va. 262, 56 S. E. 473 (1907).
28 Ibid.
'1 149 Ky. 787, at 791, 149 S. W. lOig, at io21 (i912).
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to a man and his children or to a woman and her children as a life
estate to the first taker with remainder to the children". In these
cases it is urged that especially where A is a son or daughter or
wife of the testator, there is a strong presumption arising from
this relationship that the testator's intention was to give the parent
an estate for life only-with the added argument in the case of the
wife that it is improbable that the testator wanted her to have the
right to pass her share to some stranger in blood.
20
In Pennsylvania in Graham v. Flower,21 the two resolutions
in Wild's Case were cited with approval, and both in that case and
in Shirlock v. Shirlock,22 the second resolution, namely, the con-
current gift to the parent and child (when there were children in
existence), was followed. The court in Graham v. Flower flatly
declined to uphold the opposing contention (that A took a life es-
tate) saying: "This is a conjecture which possibly may be right.
but no such intent is expressed. On the contrary there is a plain,
direct and immediate devise of one-sixth to each niece and her
children, their heirs and assigns." 23 In Coursey v. Davis,2"
however, it was decided that a grant by deed to a woman and her
children (there being children in existence at the time) vested in
her a life estate with a remainder in fee to the children as a class,
and in Hague v. Hague,23 a gift by will to A and her children was
held to create a life estate in A with remainder in fee to her chil-
dren, Shirlock v. Shirlock being in terms overruled. In the lead-
ing case of Chambers v. Union Trust Co.,26 the devise was to a
nephew, A, and his children-with a further provision in case he
should die without issue, which is immaterial to the question un-
der consideration. The Supreme Court discussed in terms whether
the first resolution in Wild's Case still applied, (there having in
fact never been any children born to A, who despite this fact
claimed [under the first resolution in Wild's Case] a fee tail, con-
' See Hood v. Dawson, 98 Ky. 285, 33 S. W. 75 (i895).
13 S. & R. 439 (Pa. 1826).
-2-5 Pa. 367 (1847).
3 Supra note 21, at 440.
2146 Pa. 25 (1863).
I6I Pa. 643, 29 Atl. 261 (1894).
2235 Pa. 6Io, 84 At. 512 (1912).
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verted by the Act of 1855 27 into a fee simple). The Supreme
Court in terms held that the first resolution in Wild's Case was
not the law in Pennsylvania:
"For the reason upon which it rests fails because of the
different interpretation which we place upon a devise to a
parent and his children . . . The theory [of the first reso-
lution] was that if there were no children in existence at the
time of the devise, the provision in their favor would fail
altogether unless the parent were given a fee tail; hence and
for that reason alone the first resolution. But with us, where
the children take in remainder, it is immaterial whether they
are or are not in existence at the time of the devise or at the
time of the death of the testator. . . . Therefore, it is not
necessary to give an artificial meaning to the devise in order
to care for the interests of the children, and there is no ap-
parent reason for adhering to the first resolution in Wild's
case". 28
The net result, therefore, is that under the law of Pennsylvania
today, if an estate is given to A and his children, A takes a life
estate with remainder to his children, regardless of whether there
are any children in existence at the date of the testator's death or
not.
The question arises whether in this recent departure by the
courts of Kentucky and Pennsylvania, the law has really come
closer to carrying out the testator's intention. The recent devel-
opment has been referred to with approval in a few English cases
such as In re Jones.29 The objection to applying at least the first
resolution (where A has no issue) to gifts of personalty seems for-
midable, namely, that the effect of the application of the rule is to
give A, the parent, an absolute interest. While in the earlier Eng-
lish cases like Stokes v. Heron 30 it was taken for granted that the
resolution did apply to gifts of personalty, in more recent cases
like In re Wilmot 31 and In re Jones,3 2 it seems to be taken for
P. L. 368.
mSupra note 26, at 615, 84 Atl. at 514.
[191o] i Ch. 167. See also HAWKINS, Wi.Ls (Ist ed. 1863) Appendix 2
ii, 316.
,0 12 Clark & F. 161, at 183 (1845).
iO3 L. T. R. 37 (1897).
' Supra note 29.
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granted that it does not. Restricting the rule, therefore, to gifts
of real estate, the question may be summarized in this simple
way. Has the court the right to assume from the fact of a gift
being made to A and his children that the testator intends that
.4 should have a life estate only, and that the children should
have the ultimate remainder? No one can deny that the use of
the phrase is so vague that it is possible that the testator may
have had such meaning; on the other hand, it may be said with
a good deal of force that if he had, it is only the most ignorant
of lawyers or conveyancers who would have failed in drawing
the instrument to make this intent clear. The case seems to the
writer to be an admirable illustration of the wisdom of the rule
which declares that the duty of a court is simply to construe the
language used, and not to consider some possible intention not
expressed by the testator. If this principle is sound, and the
writer earnestly believes that it is, it would be wiser for the courts
to follow the resolutions in Wild's Case (of course adapting them
to modern conditions with respect to the quality of the estate in
A and the children, and also whether there should be a life estate
or fee simple) rather than to jump at a conclusion, which, how-
ever possible, is certainly not in terms stated by the testator,
namely, that A is only to have a life estate.
The courts are doubtless right in scrutinizing the will to see
whether there are other circumstances from which an inference
of life estates and remainders may possibly be drawn, but in the
absence of such other circumstances, the essential principle of the
resolutions in Wild's Case seems to be sound and should be fol-
lowed by the courts today. According to this view, Chambers v.
Union Trust Co.33 was wrongly decided; the nephew should have
been held to take a fee tail, (enlarged by the Act of 1855 into a
fee simple); this being the correct meaning under the rule in
Wild's Case of the gift to the nephew and his children, mani-
festly the further provision "in case he should die without issue"
did not affect the decision. If under the rule in Wild's Case the
gift "to the nephew and his children" should be construed as
m Supra note 26.
400 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
meaning a gift "to the nephew and his issue"-in other words,
if "children" is, under the rule in Wild's Case, equivalent to
"issue", it is manfestly absurd for the further expression "if he
die without issue" to be construed to mean a definite failure of
issue; on the contrary, "children" in the former clause of the will
having been construed as a word of limitation, "issue" in this
later clause must equally be so construed-with the net effect,
therefore, that the nephew got a fee tail (now enlarged into a fee
simple) free from any divesting contingency.
The following statute would accomplish the result of re-
storing the Pennsylvania Law to its earliest form, incorporating,
however, the principle of the Act of I855 assimilating estates tail
with estates in fee simple:
"That in any deed or will executed after the date of this
Act, an estate given to A and his children shall be held to cre-
ate an estate in fee simple in A, regardless of whether A had
children or not at the date of the instrument, or at the date of
the testator's death, unless it appears from other language in the
deed or will that the grantor or testator intended to create some
different estate or estates."
Several meanings of the word "issue" (continued) : Still an-
other familiar case illustrating the prima facie meaning of the
word "issue" is the case of a devise to A for life with remainder
to his issue; it is, of course, quite clear that prima facie under the
rule in Shelley's Case, A takes an estate tail, and for precisely the
same reason, namely in order that the estate may pass on from A
to his descendants-which it could not do if the rule in Shelley's
Case did not give A an estate tail.
The application of this prima facie meaning of the word
"issue" in the case of gifts of personalty should be briefly noted.
In case of gifts of personalty as well as in the case of gifts of
realty to A and his issue, "issue" prima facie means "heirs of the
body", and therefore the same estate is given to A and the heirs of
his body. Inasmuch, however, as in the case of personalty the law
does not recognize estates tail, and inasmuch, therefore, as words
which in the case of realty would have conferred an estate tail
upon A, in the case of personalty confer an estate in fee simple
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(or absolute estate) upon him, it follows that a gift of personalty
to A and his issue gives A an absolute interest in the personalty; "
but it is important to note that this result is not reached by treat-
ing the word "issue" as any less a word of limitation than in the
case of a gift of realty, but simply, as above pointed out, because
of the fact that the Law of Property never recognized the possi-
bility of an estate tail so far as personalty is concerned.
The prima facie meaning of the word "issue", however, will
readily yield if the testator so desires. As Jarman says: 35
"If the testator annexed to the gift to the issue, words
of explanation indicating that he uses the term 'issue' in a
special and limited sense, it is, of course, restricted to that
sense", citing cases in which by context "issue" is explained
to mean "children", and other cases in which by the context
"children" is held to mean "issue".
It is not deemed necessary to elaborate this familiar thought.
B. Meaning of the word "issue" in Pennsylvania
As stated by a recent writer: "The same conditions which
impelled the English Courts to make this rule existed in Penn-
sylvania, and the courts here adopted it",30 citing numerous cases
including the leading case of Eichelberger v. Barniit. 3 7 In other
words, under the common law of Pennsylvania as under the
common law of England, the word "issue" prima facie means
"heirs of the body" and not "children", though the opposite mean-
ing will, of course, be given to it if the language of the will
shows that the testator used the words in such restricted sense;
the practical consequence, therefore, is that where the word
"issue" is given its prima facie meaning, many cases in Penn-
sylvania held that in the case of a gift to A and his issue, the
first taker got an estate tail; numerous illustrations also could
be cited where this consequence followed from a devise to A and
if he die without issue to B,38 and also from a devise to A for
2 JARMAN, op. cit. supra note 10, *1371 (p. 508).
Ibid.
"Madden, Death Without Issue (193o) 3 PENA. B. Assoc. Q. 28, at 29.
'" Supra note g.
'Sharp v. Thompson, i Whart. 139 (Pa. 1836).
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life with remainder to his issue,39 and others not necessary to enu-
merate.
C. Meaning of "dying without issue (or children)"
The word "issue" is not the only ambiguous word in the
expression "dying without issue". Considerable ambiguities may
arise with respect to the meaning of the word "without", espe-
cially when used in such expressions as dying "without children"
or "without issue". Of course, the testator may so define the
word as to leave no room for difficulty. He may, for example,
make a gift to A with a gift over "if A die without ever having
had children (or issue)", or again "without children (or issue)
surviving him". There is no difficulty in interpreting either of
these expressions, but suppose he says simply "If A die without
issue (or children)"; what does that mean? There are four pos-
sible meanings:
(i) Without ever having had issue (or children).
(2) Without issue (or children) surviving him (definite
failure).
(3) When (in the case of issue only) all the issue of all gen-
erations have expired (indefinite failure).
(4) Without issue (or children) in the lifetime of the tes-
tator only (substitutionary theory).
We now inquire which of these possible meanings of the expres-
sion "dying without issue (or children)" the law has given to
the four similar forms of this problem as set forth earlier in this
article.40
i. The first of these was a gift to A for life, remainder to his
issue. This requires no further discussion. As above pointed
out,4 in such case in the absence of any explanatory language,
where the word "issue" is construed as equivalent to "heirs of
the body" the rule in Shelley's Case applies with the result that
A takes a fee tail-remembering, of course, that in many juris-
tHaldeman v. Haldeman, 40 Pa. 29 (i86i).
" Supra p. 392.
" Supra p. 392 et seq.
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dictions in the United States, fees tail have been abolished, and
that under such statutes A would take a fee simple instead of a
fee tail (as in Pennsylvania), or A would take a life estate with
some kind of remainder, whether vested or contingent, in his
children or issue (as in Illinois and many other states). Obvi-
ously, therefore, whatever complications may follow in the case
of the three remaining forms of the problems which contain
the words "if A die without issue", no such complications follow
in the case of the first form of the problem where there is a simple
gift to A for life, remainder to his issue.
2. The second of these three wad a gift to A for life, remain-
der to his issue (or children), and if he die without issue (or chil-
dren), then to B and his heirs. In this case, if the remainder be
to children, (or if issue be construed as equivalent to children),
the problem that arises in the third and fourth with respect to
the quantum of the estate of A does not exist; A has a life estate
only.
4 2
Indeed, it may be said that in such cases the only real prob-
lem is the correct construction in the case before the court of the
words "children" or "issue". Of course, these two words prima
facie have quite distinct meanings, "children" prima facie mean-
ing only the descendants of the first generation, and "issue", as
above pointed out, prima facie including descendants of all sub-
sequent generations. The gift to A for life, remainder to his
children, therefore, creates a life estate in A with a remainder
that will vest in the children when born, whereas a gift to A for
life, remainder to his issue, if issue be construed as including all
descendants, gives A an estate tail in order that his descendants
'This was decided in Beckley v. Reigert, 212 Pa. 91, 61 AtI. 641 (905),
where the remainder was to the issue; West v. Vernon, 215 Pa. 545, 64 At. 686
(19o6), where the remainder was to "her children should she have any living,
and in case she died without leaving issue, then" over; Lewis v. Link Belt Co..
222 Pa. 139, 7o Atl. 967 (igog), where the devise was to a husband for life and
thereafter to a stepson (and daughter) for life: "But in the event of his (or
her) death leaving issue, said real estate shall go to said issue absolutely and in
fee, but in the event of the death of (the beneficiaries) without issue", then
over. In all of these cases it was contended on behalf of the first takers that
their life estates were enlarged by the clause "in the event of their death without
issue" into a fee tail (enlarged again by the Act of 1855 to a fee simple), but in
all of them the Supreme Court held to the contrary.
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for all generations may participate. Pursuing the illustration a
step further, a gift to A for life, remainder to his children, and
if he shall die without children to B and his heirs, creates two
alternative remainders to take effect at A's death, one in favor
of his children if he have any, and the other in favor of B. If
the devise is to A for life remainder to his issue, and if he die
without issue then to B and his heirs, if issue be construed as
including all descendants, A takes a fee tail and B (at common
law) a remainder after a fee tail. Quite often the two words
are both loosely used, as for instance in cases like West v. Ver-
non 43 where there was an original remainder to children with
a subsequent gift over in case A die without issue, and on the so-
called referential theory it was held that the testator doubtless
meant to designate the same class when he created the remainder
in favor of the children. To put the case quite simply, in a case
of a gift to A for life remainder to his children, there is no ques-
tion but what the rule in Shelley's Case does not apply, and that
A gets a life estate with remainder to his children, nor is A's
estate enlarged by the further clause "if A die without children
then to B and his heirs". On the other hand, in the case of a gift
to A for life remainder to his issue, the rule in Shelley's Case
does apply, and A takes an estate tail, and the further clause "if
A die without issue" does not affect the prior estate tail to A,
but simple gives B a remainder after an estate tail.
The critical factor in case No. 2 44 is the gift to the children
(or issue construed as meaning children). Wherever there is
such direct gift to the children (or issue) vested in them either
at birth or on some other contingency, there is a distinct tendency
in the decisions (in the interest of such children or issue) to in-
terpret the subsequent clause "if A die without children (or
issue)" as meaning "without ever having had such children or
issue"-with the result, therefore, that the interest which had
originally vested in the children or issue is not divested by the
subsequent death of the life tenant, even if at the time of his
death he leaves no children or issue surviving him. Indeed, in
' Supra note 42.
" Supra p. 392.
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Treharne v. Layton 45 even the phrase "dying without leaving
children or issue" was construed to mean "dying without ever
having had children or issue" in the interest of such children
or issue.
46
Attention also perhaps should be called at this point to the
fact that where the so-called substitutionary interpretation of the
expression "dying without issue" prevails, (a matter shortly to
be discussed), such construction, if adopted in a particular jur-
isdiction, may apply even to the case now under consideration.
For example, in Hogg's Estate47 a testator bequeathed a part
interest in his farm to a granddaughter, and "In case of the death
of the granddaughter without an heir", to third persons. The
question being whether the granddaughter took more than a life
interest, the Superior Court held that she took a fee. They held
that the word "heir" in the expression "dying without an heir"
must mean "heirs of the body" or "issue", and after holding that
if the testator intended to provide for an indefinite failure of issue,
the daughter of course, took an estate in fee simple at the present
time, said that even if it were a definite failure of issue (under
the substitutionary view) such expression as "if he (the first
taker) die without children," or the like, must be construed as
referring to that event occurring in the lifetime of the testator
only-with the result that in that event also the granddaughter
took a fee simple.
3. The third case 48 was a gift to A for life, and if he die
without issue, then to B and his heirs. The preliminary inquiry is
whether "issue" is used in the sense of "descendants" or in the
sense of "children"; this question is to be discussed and decided
in the light of the principles heretofore laid down.49  Assuming
that in a particular case it be decided in favor of the meaning
"children", it is obvious that if A dies without children, the prop-
's J R. io Q. B. 549 (1875).
"See KALeFs, FuTuRE INTERESTS (i920) 630-632; THEOBALD, WILLS (8th
ed. 1927) 790-791.
"727 Pa. Super. 429 (19o5).
'6Supra p. 392.
1 Supra p. 392 et seq.
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erty passes to B; the testator, however, has not specified what
shall happen if A dies leaving children. There are two possible
constructions. The first is that the testator not having made
any express gift to the children, the children take nothing and
the estate passes at A's death leaving children under the residuary
clause or to the testator's heirs. The common law is quite clear
that this is the correct conclusion.5"
Many American courts, however, hold to the contrary, on
the ground that though there is no express gift to the children,
a gift to the children must be implied, as otherwise the purpose
of the testator to make a further provision only if there were no
children would be meaningless.
In Pennsylvania, it is frequently stated that a gift to the issue
will be implied. In Beilstein v. Beilstein,5 ' a testator left a piece
of real estate to his daughter "as long as she lives, but should she
die without leaving a family", then over. She died unmarried
and without issue, leaving a will by which she devised the prop-
erty to the defendant, who was her mother. In an action of eject-
ment by the devisees over, the Supreme Court affirmed a judgment
below for the defendant, saying: "The devise over in case Gertie
should die without leaving a family is an implied devise to her
family if she should leave one. It is only if she does not that
the devise over is to take effect, and there is the necessary implica-
tion that in the other unexpressed contingency of her leaving a
family, the estate is to go to them". 2  Although, apparently,
under this statement the estate would have gone to her children
or descendants if she had left any, the Supreme Court neverthe-
less construed the word "family" as equivalent to descendants,
and held that the daughter, therefore, took a fee tail which under
the Act of 1855 was enlarged to a fee simple. The apparent con-
tradiction should be noted that whereas in the passage quoted
from the opinion it is stated in terms that there was "an implied
I JARMAN, op. cit. supra note io, at *674 (p. 697).
"'194 Pa. 152, 45 AtI. 73 (80).
Ibid. at i54, 45 AtI. at 74.
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devise to her family", yet the ultimate conclusion reached is not
(as one would expect) that, there being no family, the estate
passed to the devisees over, but quite to the contrary that the
daughter's original life estate was enlarged to a fee tail by virtue
of what the court has previously described as an implied gift to
the family. Apparently, the learned court fell into an error; if,
as the decisions seem to hold, the word "family" in the case in
question is construed as equivalent to descendants, it of course
was properly held that the daughter took a fee tail enlarged by
the Act of 1855 to a fee simple, but it seems hardly accurate in
such case to speak of an implied gift in favor of the family or
descendants. However, the Court has several times since then
reiterated that in such cases there is an implied gift in favor of
the issue or family.5 3
The writer's comment on the two conflicting views as to
whether a gift to the issue or children should be implied or not
in such cases will be reserved for a later paper in which he will
discuss the propriety of implying estates from a broader view-
point.
Assume, however, that in case No.3 54 the expression "if A
die without issue" be construed as meaning "when his descend-
ants shall expire". Manifestly, in such case, in spite of the in-
formality of the language employed, A's life estate is enlarged
'For instance, in English's Estate, 27o Pa. I, 112 At. 913 (921), where,
however, there was a direct gift after the daughter's death to her issue the
Court says at page 6, i12 Atl. at 915, by way of dictum only: "In a will when
the average person says that he gives an estate to A for life and if A shall die
without issue, then the estate shall go to B, most often the intention is that at A's
death if he has any children then living, they shall take the estate in fee, and if
not, B shall have it"; this is a very direct statement that a gift shall be implied
in favor of the children, with no suggestion that the indirect effect of so imply-
ing it is to create an estate tail in the life tenant, and thereby cut out the chil-
dren (as was the result in Beilstein v. Beilstein, supra note 51). Finally, in the
recent case of Martin v. Grinage, 289 Pa. 473, 137 Atl. 676 (1927) the Court
says, on page 489, 137 Ati. at 682: "Where a devisee is given merely a life estate
with a provision that on his death at a definite time without heirs or issue or
children, as the case may be, the property is to go over to others, the dying
without issue provision is usually read as implying a remainder in the life
tenant's issue, heirs or children if he leaves any"-another plain statement in
support of the implication of an estate in favor of the issue or children, as the
case may be.
" Supra p. 392.
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unto a fee tail, and B's estate instead of being an executory devise
contingent on A's dying without children, becomes an ordinary
remainder after a fee tail.
As above pointed out, this was the view that the Supreme
Court took in Beilstein v. Beilstein; '5 the decision was that the
daughter took an estate in fee tail enlarged by the Act of 1855
into a fee simple-which was correct if the expression "should
she die without leaving a family" is equivalent to "should she
die without issue". The only difference, in case the subject mat-
ter is personalty, is that though in the eyes of the common law
the testator's purpose was the same, yet as the common law did
not permit an estate tail in the case of personalty, A took a fee
simple or absolute estate (precisely as he would if the personalty
had been bequeathed to A absolutely), and the attempted remain-
der to B after the absolute estate to A failed, precisely as if a
testator gave real estate to A and his heirs, remainder to B and
his heirs, the remainder to B would fail because, having given
the fee simple to A, there was in the eyes of the common law
nothing left to give to B.
4. There remains for consideration the most familiar type of
cases of this general character, namely No. 4, the gift to A and
his heirs, and if he die without issue, then to B and his heirs.
Here again the whole problem is substantially solved when the
court has arrived at the proper construction of the word "issue".
If (and this, of course, is its prima facie meaning) the word
"issue" be construed as equivalent to "heirs of the body", it is
quite settled that A takes a fee tail (enlarged by the Act of 1855
into a fee simple), and B takes a vested remainder after a fee
tail (rendered of no value by the same Act of 1855 because after
a fee simple in A there is nothing left for B). If, on the other
hand, the word "issue" be construed as equivalent to children, A,
of course, takes a fee simple with an executory devise over in
favor of B, if A dies without children. This very brief state-
ment will be fully elaborated in the study which follows of estates
tail in Pennsylvania.
'Supra note 51.
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D. Estates tail in Pennsylvania
It is, of course, familiar to Pennsylvania lawyers that estates
tail were introduced into this country in general, and in particular
to the state of Pennsylvania, along with the other estates known
to the common law. Not only estates tail themselves, but some
of the more remarkable qualities pertaining to estates tail were
so introduced, particularly the possibility of barring remainders
following estates tail by the familiar proceedings known as fines
and common recoveries. Many cases may be found in the early
Pennsylvania reports in which such remainders after estates tail
were barred and the estates tail thereby converted into estates in
fee simple.56
The essential idea of an estate tail, namely, an estate which
would pass from A down through his descendants indefinitely is,
however, of doubtful value under modern social and economic
conditions. However appropriate in a country like England
where the oldest son inherits to the exclusion of younger sons
and daughters, it is of doubtful value in a country like the United
States where all sons and daughters inherit equally. 57 Again, the
conception of an estate tail was more practical in the fifteenth cen-
tury when a man's property was not liable for his debts, than it is
in the twentieth century when the opposite principle is taken for
granted. Changing notions both with respect to the laws of in-
heritance and also with respect to seizure of property for the debts
of either a living or deceased owner have naturally served to cast
doubt upon the desirability of the old estate tail, and in most of
the states of this country statutes have been passed, the effect of
which is to do away with estates tail after the passage of the
statute. The earliest statute of this character was in the state
of New York.5 8 In New York, and many states which followed
its lead, the effect of such statutes is that "the estate tail is changed
into a fee which will become a fee simple absolute if the first taker
Dunwoodie v. Reed, 3 S. & R. 435 (Pa. 1817) ; Lyle v. Richards, 9 S. & R.
322 (Pa. 1823) ; Carter v. McMichael, Io S. & R. 429 (Pa. 1823).
Although in Pennsylvania estates tail (where they still exist) pass as at
common law, and not according to the statutory rules of inheritance: Reinhart
v. Lantz, 37 Pa. 488 (186o).
I Laws of 1782, c. 2; Laws of 1786, c. 12.
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is survived by issue, but if he dies without issue, his estate in fee
ends and goes over to the person named as remainderman".5 9  In
other states again: "The estate tail is changed into a life estate
in the first taker with the remainder in fee simple to his child or
children". 60 In other states again: "Every estate given in fee
tail shall be an absolute estate in fee simple to the issue of the
first donee in tail, the estate tail in the donee being changed into
an estate in fee simple in the issue of such donee on his death". 6'
In Pennsylvania the Act of April 27, 1855,62 provides in effect
that all gifts, conveyances or devises made thereafter which would
theretofore have created estates tail should thereafter create fees
simple. In Pennsylvania, since 1855, therefore, it is quite clear that
if an estate be devised to A and the heirs of his body, or to A and
his issue, or to A for life with remainder to his issue, by force of
the statute A takes a fee simple, and of course any attempted re-
mainders following such fee simple are simply null and void. There
is, however, a class of cases in which this statute has been applied
where the result does not seem to be satisfactory. Take, for exam-
ple, the familiar gift to A and his heirs, and if he die without issue
then to B and his heirs; prior to the Act of 1855, as above pointed
out, it was quite well settled in Pennsylvania (as elsewhere) that
the effect of the words "if A die without issue" was to reduce
the fee simple previously conferred upon A to a fee tail, and to
give to B a remainder following the expiration of the estate tail
in A. 63  After the Act of 1855, as a result of the same reason-
ing, the Court held that A had a fee tail which by the Act of 1855
was changed to a fee simple, and that therefore B's remainder
after A's fee tail was null and void.
6 4
' WALSH, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1927) 153.
Ibid. citing the New Jersey statute and decisions.
'Ibid. citing Connecticut and Ohio statutes.
Supra note 27.
Sharp v. Thompson, i Whart. 139 (Pa. 1836).
"Hackney v. Tracy, 137 Pa. 53, 56, 2o Ati. 56o (i89o), where counsel
argued: "We must still determine what estate the devisee would take inde-
pendent of the act [of 1855], and if that estate be a fee tail, the Act converts it
into a fee simple"-which argument was tacitly adopted by the Court though
the Act itself was not mentioned in the opinion; Jones v. Gulf Refining Co., 295
Pa. 92, 144 At]. 895 (1929).
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E. Act of July 9, 1897, P. L. 213
It is submitted that these cases were wrongly decided; the
framers of the Act of 1855, while they intended to abolish estates
tail that were created in terms, could hardly have intended to apply
the statute to cases where the estate tail was not a direct creation
of the testator, but an indirect deduction from the language em-
ployed by him; it is believed that to apply the Act of 1855 to the
case of a gift to A and his heirs and if he die without issue to
B and his heirs (thus entirely nullifying the intended gift to B
and his heirs) is highly undesirable-whatever the correct con-
struction of the expression "if he die without issue" before the
Act of 1855, it should certainly, after the passage of that Act, have
been construed to mean a definite failure of issue at A's death.
The injury to B's interest which resulted from applying the Act
of 1855 to this case was so serious that by the Act of July 9,
1897 "5 (restricted to wills by the Act of June 17, 1917) 66 words
in a will thereafter executed relating to death without issue "or
any other words which may import either a want or failure of
issue of any person in his lifetime, or at his death, or an indefi-
nite failure of his issue, shall be construed to mean a want or fail-
ure of issue in the lifetime, or at the death of such person, and
not an indefinite failure of his issue, unless a contrary intention
shall appear by the will in which such devise or bequest is made".
This act was applied to a gift to A and his heirs, but if "he should
die without lawful issue", to B and his heirs in Smith v. Piper,
67
with the result that instead of A receiving a fee simple absolute
(as in Hackney v. Tracy 68) it was held that the limitation over
to B was valid by way of executory devise, and that A could not
convey a fee simple so long as she was without issue.
In passing, the language of the Act of 1897 (as modified by
the Act of 1917) is taken verbatim from the English Wills Act.69
It is an interesting speculation why such an obviously necessary
6P. L. 213.
0 P. L. 403, § 14.
'23I Pa. 378, 8o At. 877 (19i).
cS Supra note 64.
7 Wm. IV & I Vcr. C. 26, § 29 (1837)
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change (which was made in England as early as 1837) should
have failed to be followed in Pennsylvania until sixty years later,
especially as the Act of 1855, as above pointed out, much aggra-
vated the difficulties which the common law rules of construction,
preferring an indefinite to a definite failure of issue, had caused.
The "equity" of the Act was successfully invoked in Eng-
lish's Estate,70 where, citing it, the Court held that in the case
of a gift to A for life, remainder to her issue, (with a gift over if
there were no issue) A had only a life estate (though prior to the
Act of 1897, under the rule in Shelley's Case, A would probably
have had an estate tail).
A further interesting question with respect to the construc-
tion of the Act of 1897 arose in Hays's Estate,7' the same will
had previously been passed upon by the Supreme Court in Dil-
worth v. Schuylkill Improvement Land Co.72 By the will, which
became operative in 19o2, land, inter alia, was devised to an un-
married daughter "with the power to appoint among her children
or their issue, if any she have, and in default of issue" to others.
In the Dilworth case the daughter having married, joined with
her husband Dilworth in an agreement to sell certain property,
claiming that by virtue of the words of her father's will she had
a fee simple, but the Court held that under the Act of 1897 she
had only a life estate. Later, her husband having died, she mar-
ried a Mr. Craig and a son was born; she then entered upon a
new agreement of sale of the property, contending that she be-
came absolute owner of the estate when a child was born to her.
The Supreme Court, in the Hays's case, stated the position of her
counsel as follows: "The conclusion is drawn that the rule of con-
struction fixed by the Act [of 1897] becomes inoperative if there
be any children born during life"; 73 the Supreme Court, however,
declined to admit that the birth of issue enlarged the estate of
the daughter and said:
"The word 'or' as used in the clause 'in the lifetime
or at the death' appearing in the Act of 1897 and relied upon
11 Supra note 53.
72286 Pa. 520, 134 At. 402 (1926).
72219 Pa. 527, 69 AtI. 47 (i9o8).
.286 Pa. at 526, 134 Atd. at 403.
PROBLEMS ARISING IN THE LAW OF PROPERTY
by appellant is evidently intended as a conjunctive and the
failure of issue is to be determined as of the date when the
first taker dies. The statutory rule is applicable and the
daughter took an interest for life only as heretofore held,
though a child had been born to her." 74
The result obviously might have been different if the original
gift had been to the daughter in fee simple with a proviso that in
default of issue it was to go over; manifestly in such case, when
issue was born, the possibility of default of issue had vanished,
and the daughter could have conveyed a fee simple free from any
chance of being divested.
What appears to be a confusion of ideas in connection with
this act is found in Hannon v. Fliedner.75 The testator, who died
in 1879, left certain properties after the decease of his wife and
sister-in-law to a daughter, Mary Kirker, in fee. "But in case of
the decease of my said daughter Mary Kirker without lawful
issue surviving her, then and in such case I give, devise and
bequeath all my property and estate of every description, real,
personal and mixed to my son-in-law Dr. John Kirker, his heirs
and assigns forever." Dr. and Mrs. Kirker had one son, Robert
S. Kirker, who died in 1902 unmarried, intestate and without
issue. Dr. Kirker was divorced from his wife in 1888 and died
in 1897 leaving to survive him a widow, a daughter by his first
wife (who is the plaintiff herein), the son Robert S. Kirker by
his second wife Mary (the testator's daughter), and a daughter
Rose by his third wife. Mary, the testator's daughter, died in
19o5. The plaintiff, Mrs. Hannon, claimed as the heir of Dr.
Kirker a one-half interest in the land in question and sold the
same to defendant; this case stated was agreed on to determine
whether she had an interest in the property. Quoting Mickley's
Appeal,76 the lower court said:
"We find no evidence in the will of Mr. Stewart of any
intention to cut down the estate of Mrs. Kirker by giving to
the words 'without lawful issue surviving her' any other than
71 Ibid.
1216 Pa. 470, 65 AtI. 944 (i9o7).
"'92 Pa. 514 (i88o).
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their well established meaning. In the absence of evidence
indicating such intention, it seems clear to us testator created
what would have been an estate tail prior to the Act of Apr.
27, 1855, but which that Act and the line of cases referred
to converted into a fee simple estate. Mrs. Kirker, having
survived her father and under his will taken an estate in fee
simple in the property described in this case, it follows that
plaintiffs have no interest therein".
The judgment for defendant was affirmed by the Supreme Court
on the opinion of the court below. It would seem as if the sub-
stitionary doctrine laid down in Mickley's Appeal would either
prior or subsequent to 1897, have been applicable, as it is clearly
applicable to a case where the court finds that the testator intends
a definite as opposed to an indefinite failure of issue: But assum-
ing this to be so, it is difficult to see why the lower court
says that the "testator created what would have been an estate
tail prior to the Act of Apr. 27, 1855, but which that Act and
the line of cases converted into a few simple estate". There is an
apparent contradiction in terms in the opinion of the lower court
in first holding that the case falls within the ruling of Mickley's
Appeal which, as we shall see, is limited to gifts over on a definite
failure of issue, and yet a few lines later in its opinion say that
the testator intended to create an estate tail (which, of course,
presupposes that the testator was contemplating an indefinite fail-
ure of issue). The result prior to the Act of 1897 was the same
in both cases, i. e. the first taker under the substitutionary doctrine
takes a fee because the divesting contingency has not occurred in
the testator's lifetime, and on the indefinite failure of issue theory
he equally takes an estate in fee because the estate tail which he
would have taken at common law was enlarged by the Act of
1855 into a fee simple.
F. The barring of contingent remainders in Pennsylvania
It is, of course, familiar to students of the Law of Property
that as a result of a series of judicial decisions and statutes in
England, it was possible for the holder of a life estate to destroy
contingent remainders by either a deliberate forfeiture of the life
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estate or by a merger of the life estate with an ultimate vested
remainder in fee or reversion. It is not so generally known that
this system of barring contingent remainders was adopted into
the law of Pennsylvania.77  Of course, however, this doctrine
was based wholly upon the theory of seisin, with the necessity of
having always a tenant in possession ready to perform legal duties.
There is, therefore, much to be said in favor of the view that when
the doctrine of seisin has been abandoned, the law should no
longer permit the destruction of remainders by forfeiture or
merger, and this change has been accomplished by statutes in
England, and in a number of states including New York, Alabama,
Arizona, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucy, Maine, Massachu-
setts, Michigan, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vir-
ginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, with partially covering statutes
in South Carolina and Texas. In most of these jurisdictions
the statutes extend even further, and (contrary to the rule of the
common law) uphold a contingent remainder where the life estate
ends naturally before the contingency on which the remainder
depends has happened.
It is an interesting question whether contingent remainders
may still be barred in states which follow the common law where
no statutes have been passed to the contrary. There were many
such states where the destruction of contingent remainders had
been adopted as part of their property system, including Missis-
sippi, South Carolina, Illinois, and Iowa, while courts of others,
like Kentucky, have used dicta to the same effect. In Illinois,
comparatively recently, in the case of Bond v. Moore,"" the
Supreme Court without question upheld the effort on the part of
a life tenant to bar a contingent remainder by means of an appli-
cation of the doctrine of merger." 9 Whether the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania would at the present time uphold the destruction
of contingent remainders either by forfeiture or by merger may
I Bennett v. Morris, 5 Rawle 8 (Pa. 1835), followed in many later cases.
236 Il1. 576, 86 N. E. 386 (i9O8).
'But see Act of July 2, i92i, page 47o, ILL. REV. STAT. (Cahill, 1925) c.
148, § 24: "No .future interest shall fail or be defeated by the determination of
any precedent estate or interest prior to the happening of the event or contin-
gency on which the future interest is limited to take effect".
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be seriously questioned. In Harris v. McElroy, 0 though the
question was not directly involved, the court quoted the dissenting
opinion of Chief Justice Gibson in Lyle v. Richards,81 and the
subsequent English Act 82 barring contingent remainders by for-
feiture, and thus refers to a suggestion that the trustee in the case
before the court might be directed to convey property to the plain-
tiff in order to enable her to destroy the contingent interests of her
children and grandchildren: "This court will never give its aid
to produce such a destruction of the interest of persons whom the
appellant was bound to protect." On the other hand, in Stewart
v. Neely, 3 a case where a party tried to bar contingent remainders
by invoking the doctrine of merger, though the judge in the lower
court criticized the whole doctrine of barring contingent remain-
ders, the Supreme Court in affirming said: "The authorities cited
on behalf of the appellants were not necessary to sustain the
familiar rule of the common law that a contingent remainder must
have an estate of freehold to support it." 84 In other words, the
Supreme Court seemed tacitly to uphold the barring of contingent
remainders in a proper case, but held that it did not apply to the
case at bar, partly because the life estate was merged not with a
vested remainder or reversion, but only with a contingent remain-
der, and partly because the contingent remainder had been con-
veyed by deed and not by will. Despite this, which is the most
recent dictum of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania on the
subject, it seems probable that that Court would not at the present
day uphold the deliberate destruction of a contingent remainder
either by forfeiture or by merger, and yet there is a doubt on
the subject, which it seems desirable to remove. Further, even
though the Supreme Court might refuse to uphold the destruction
of contingent remainders by deliberate act, there is nothing to
indicate that it would, if the case now arose, reverse the case of
Stehman v. Stehinan,85 which has never been overruled, or even
adversely commented on.
8'45 Pa. 216 (1863).
89 S. & R. 322, 343 (Pa. 1823).
'8 & 9 ViCm. c. io6 (845).
139 Pa. 309, 2o Ati. 1002 (I891).
84Ibid. at 315, 2o At. at ioo2.
i Watts 466 (Pa. 1833).
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This case laid down for Pennsylvania the same strict rule
that had been laid down in England in Festing v. Allen." In
that case land had been devised to trustees for the use of the
testator's wife for her life or widowhood "then to a grand-
daughter Martha Hannah Johnson for life" with remainder to
"all and every the child or children of her the said Martha Hannah
Johnson who shall attain the age of 21 years." Martha Hannah
Johnson survived the widow and died leaving three infant chil-
dren, and the main question was whether the children took any
interest in the devised premises. It was held that they did not,
but that " . . . as no child had attained 21 when the particular
estate determined by her death, the remainder (to her children)
was necessarily defeated." 87 Similarly in Stehman v. Stehman
there was a devise to the testator's widow for life and after her
death "to the male heirs of Tobias if any he gets in fee" and "for
want of male heirs of Tobias, to the male heirs of his son John
in fee". At the death of the widow Tobias was single, but he
afterwards married and had children. It was held that the limi-
tations over at the death of the widow were contingent remainders,
and for want of male heirs of Tobias at her death, vested in
the male heirs of John. To the argument that the testator evi-
dently contemplated that the male heirs of Tobias who .might
come into existence at any time were to take, Judge Gibson said:
" . . . the inflexible rule which demands that no limita-
tion be deemed an executory devise if it may by any practical
construction be sustained as a contingent remainder, over-
bears all implications of an intention inconsistent with it and
is decisive of the question. This too, for the all sufficient
reason that these executory devises being inconsistent with
the policy of the Common Law, which, on account of its
abhorrence of estates commencing in futuro, requires all the
precedent parts of the fee to pass out of the grantor at the
same instant, are barely tolerated and only in favor of the
explicit declaration of one who may have been compelled
to dispose of his estate when unassisted by counsel". 88
"12 M. &W. 279 (843).
Ibid. at 299.
i Watts, at 475.
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Festing v. Allen was followed in a long line of cases in Eng-
land, though not -without protest.8 9 It was, however, found so
unsatisfactory that by statute 90 it was enacted:
"That every contingent remainder created by any in-
strument executed after the passing of this Act or by any
will or codicil revived or republished by any will or codicil
executed after this date in tenure or hereditament of any
tenure which could have been valid as springing or shifting
use or executory devise or other limitation had it not had a
sufficient estate to support it as a contingent remainder, shall
in the event of the particular estate determining before the
contingent remainder vests, be capable of taking effect in all
respects as if the contingent remainder had originally been
created as a springing or shifting use or executory devise or
other executory limitation."
Of this Vaizey says91 :
"Yet even this statute appears to have left one case un-
provided for, and in which it may still be necessary to insert
limitations to trustees to preserve. If a remainder is limited
to such children as shall attain a certain age and when the
last particular estate determines some only of those children
have attained that age, the remainder will vest in them. Con-
sequently, the Act will not operate and the younger children
will be excluded."
In some, at any rate, of the states in this country the courts
have found the rule of Festing v. Allen unsatisfactory. In Henry
v. Spaulding,2- after an interest to his wife during her life or
widowhood, the testator bequeathed "all the property in her
hands and possession at the time of the happening of either event
in equal shares to the children of my two sons, Charles A. Spauld-
ing and Albert M. Spaulding, and their heirs forever". These
two sons were the testator's only descendants. Charles died in
his mother's lifetime leaving a widow but no children. At the
. Astley v. Micdethwait, 15 Ch. D. 5! (iSo) ; Dean v. Dean, [891] 3 Ch.
15o; White v. Summers, 11908] 2 Ch. 256.
. 4 0 & 41 VIcr. c. 33 (1877).
mVAIZEY, LAW OF SETT.NiEnxTs, 1164.
'75 N. M. 92, 71 Ad. 219 (1!o8).
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time of this litigation Albert was a bachelor about fifty years of
age. This was a petition filed by the administrator of the dece-
dent for advice of the court, after the widow's death. Recogniz-
ing that the original gift to the children of the two sons was "to
a dubious or uncertain person"; recognizing further that in
certain jurisdictions (having doubtless in mind Festing v. Allen)
this gift could not be construed as an executory devise, the court
said: 93
"The testator intended that his real estate, as well as
personal property, should go to the children of his two sons.
The gift was one he had power to make. The fact that his
wife survived him or that no child was born in the lifetime
of the widow is not a sufficient reason for breaking his
will".
In other words, the court held that if Albert should marry and
have children after his mother's death, they would be entitled.
94
Gray, in the third edition of his "Rule against Perpetuities",
after reviewing the rule of Festing v. Allen, reached the conclu-
sion that it "had its origin in the dislike of uses which is so forci-
bly expressed in the preamble of the Statute of Uses"; he urges in
Section 928: "When a positive rule of law has become obnoxious
to the courts, they may deal with it in three ways:
"First, they may follow it and leave it to the Legislature to
alter it;
"Second, they may say it is unsuited to modern conceptions
and may disregard it;
"Third, they may change it from a positive rule of law to
a rule of construction".
He contends in Section 930 that his third method, which is
the one adopted in the cases that dissent from Festing v. Allen,
seems the least desirable for "regarded as a rule of construction,
there is no reason or sense in it; it is purely arbitrary", calling
attention to the similar confusion that grows out of trying to
treat the rule in Shelley's Case as a rule based on intent.
0Ibid. at 94, 71 AtI. at 221.
"See also to the same effect Simonds v. Simonds, 1gg Mass. 552, 85 AtI.
86o (igo8).
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Following Gray's suggestion of a statutory change, it seems
desirable so to phrase the statute that it will apply even to the
case mentioned by Vaizey, and also to make it quite clear that
contingent remainders can no longer be barred in this state, and
the following act (which in so far as it accomplishes the first pur-
pose is more comprehensive than the recent Illinois statute above
referred to) is suggested for this purpose:
"No remainder or other interest shall be defeated by
the determination of the precedent estate or interest prior
to the happening of the event or contingency on which the
remainder or expectant interest is limited to take effect, and
any rule which requires a future interest which by possi-
bility may take effect as a remainder to do so or fail entirely
is hereby abolished."
Needless to add, such a statute would not affect the barring
of remainders after estates tail in those cases in which, owing to
the estates having been created prior to the Act of 1855, estates
tail still exist in Pennsylvania. Even prior to the Act of i855
(which in effect prohibited the creation of estates tail thereafter
in Pennsylvania), it was well settled that remainders after estates
tail, whether vested or contingent, could be barred either by fines
or common recoveries, or by a disentailing conveyance under the
Act of January i6, I7 9 9 .05 There is every reason in modem
times why the power of the tenant in tail to bar remainders after
the estate tail, in other words the power to convert his fee tail into
a fee simple, should be sustained, and no doubt is entertained that
the courts would uphold such right if the question were now
raised.
Of course, however, in the case of a gift to A and his heirs,
and if he die without issue then to B and his heirs, the court may
find from the context or from the nature of the subject matter
that the expression "if he die without issue" does not have its
normal meaning of "when his issue shall have expired", but does
mean "if he die without children"; naturally, there is no room for
any doubt if the testator has himself used the language "if he
93 SmImh's LAws (I8IO) 338, § I.
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die without children". But in many cases, of which Snyder's
Appeal 91 is an example, the courts have found that the phrase
"if he die without issue" really means "if he die without chil-
dren". Under that construction a further problem arises, namely,
whether the clause "if he die without issue" means "if he die
without ever having had issue", or whether it means "without
issue surviving him". There is not much authority upon this
point, but what authority there is distinctly favors the latter views.
Several possible meanings are referred to in the opinion in Sny-
der's Appeal," but the court was not obliged by the facts of that
case to decide the point.
The later view was definitely taken in Hugher v. Sayer,98 and
in Pinbury v. Elkin. The cases in this country in which
the question seems to have been squarely raised and decided are
Morgan v. Morgan,100 and Parish v. Ferris.10 In Morgan v.
Morgan, after making gifts to several children testator provided
"that if my sons should either of them die without children, his
brother shall have his part in equal proportion". One son John
took possession of the property devised to him, was married and
had one son who died two years before John's death. When the
son John died, he therefore had no children. The question was
whether the land in question was a part of the estate of the son
John and therefore liable to his creditors, or whether it had passed
by virtue of the gift over to' another son Edward who was the
defendant in this case. In holding that it passed to the other son,
the court said:
"In the mind of the testator, had he foreseen the event
of the birth and death of a grandson without having had
children before the death of his father, the same reason
would have existed for designating the person or persons to
succeed to the estate as would be on the death of either son
without children living at the time of the son's death. There-
95 Pa. 174 (1884).
t' Ibid. at 178.
1 P. Wins. 534 (1718).
"9Ibid. 563 (1719).
1 5 Day 517 (Conn. 1813).
"'16 Ohio St. 563 (1856).
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fore, to adopt the construction contended for would defeat
an important provision manifestly intended by the testator,
by adding the last clause of the will, viz.-the disposition
of either son's part in case of death without children then
living." 102
In other words, while it would be theoretically possible for the
testator so to provide that the gift over should not take effect
if the first taker had had a son who died in his lifetime, yet it
would be such an absurd provision with so little reason to support
it that the courts would be extremely unlikely so to hold; sub-
stantially the same reasoning led to the same result in Parish v.
Ferris.
G. Summary
The result so far may be summarized as follows: The words
"dying without issue", if there were an independent gift to the
issue, meant "without ever having had" issue-(this in the inter-
est of such issue when born) ; on the other hand, if there were no
independent gift to the issue (which is the common case), the
words in the case of real estate were not construed either as mean-
ing "without ever having had issue" on the one hand, or "with-
out issuing surviving" (definite failure of issue) on the other;
both of these constructions (which were familiar in the case of
a gift over if A die without children) were dismissed, and the
presumption in favor of estates tail resulted in such expression
being construed as an indefinite failure of issue. A devise of
land to A and his heirs and if he die without issue to B and his
heirs, therefore meant at common law, on the indefinite failure
of issue view, that A took an estate tail; as between the definite
and indefinite failure of issue possibilities, the common law chose
the indefinite failure of issue, and therefore it was not necessary
to consider other questions that might have arisen on the other
theory-such as whether dying without issue meant without hav-
ing had issue, or without leaving issue surviving; nor on the other
hand was it necessary to discuss as of what date A must die
Supra note ioO, at 524.
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without issue in order for the gift over to become effective. It
is perhaps, however, proper to add that prior to the nineteenth
century, in spite of a great number of cases in which the ques-
tion whether such words contemplated a definite or indefinite fail-
ure of issue was discussed, it was never questioned that if they
were to be construed as contemplating a definite failure of issue
(as they were in the case of personalty), the gift over to B would
take effect if at the time of A's death he had no issue, and no one
up to that time had even suggested that the gift over to B was
to take effect only if A died without issue in the testators tife-
time.
This naturally leads to a consideration of the quite recent
substitutionary construction of such phrases as "if A die without
issue", which will be discussed in the second installment of this
article.
(Editor's Note: The concluding installment of this article will appear in
the March issue of the Rpviaw.)
